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RADIATION AND PRECONCEPTION INJURIES: SOME
INTERESTING PROBLEMS IN TORT LAW
by Charles L. Moore
With progressively increasing uses of nuclear energy and its resultant
radiation risks the full legal impact of the genetic consequences of
radiation exposure is an issue of present and great importance to
lawyers.'
That there are difficult and unique legal problems associated with the
development and peaceful use of nuclear energy has long been recognized
by academicians and commentators. 2  The tort problems in this regard are
intriguing and have resulted in considerable comment despite a relative
paucity of reported tort cases.8 There are several factors which make this
an appropriate juncture for a reevaluation of the tort problems. First, to-
day's ubiquitous energy crisis has the potential for transforming academic
and theoretical tort questions involving nuclear energy into hard cases in the
not-too-distant future. 4 Nuclear power generation may not be a panacea
for all of the energy problems, but it appears to be considered by many
to be an important source of long-term salvation from dependence on oil
for electrical power production.5 Expanded use of nuclear energy for any
purpose will inevitably serve to increase the exposure of the public to pos-
1. Estep & Forgotson, Legal Liability for Genetic Injuries from Radiation, 24 LA.
L. REV. 1 (1963).
2. See Murphy, Atomic Energy and the Law: A Bibliography, 12 VAND. L. REV.
229 (1958). This is an excellent and exhaustive bibliography which reveals the volum-
inous writing in the field before 1958. For a recent bibliography of -the many con-
tributions of one extraordinary scholar, the late Dean E. Blythe Stason of the Univer-
sity of Michigan Law School, to this area of the law, see A Complete Bibliography
of Books, Pamphlets, Major Reports, Speeches, and Memoranda of E. Blythe Stason,
71 MICH. L. REV. 467, 469-71 (1973).
3. See generally E. STASON, S. EsTP & W. PIERCE, ATOMS AND THE LAw (1959)
[hereinafter cited as ATOMS]. See also Murphy, supra note 2.
4. As an indication of this, news reports of the problems and prospects for nu-
clear power are becoming more frequent. See, e.g., Wall Street Journal, Nov. 6, 1973,
at I, col. 6 (Southwest ed.), in which reference is made to the theoretical impact of
a major nuclear reactor accident. An AEC report is cited which estimated that in such
an unlikely event, 45,000 people might be killed, 100,000 injured and $17 billion in
property damage sustained. See also Wall Street Journal, Dec. 31, 1973, at 1, col. 3
(Southwest ed.), in which the AEC Chairman is quoted as saying that nuclear power
plant accidents are not as great a risk as commonly believed.
5. "Although our greatest dependence for energy until now has been on fossil
fuels such as coal and oil, we must not and we need not continue this heavy reliance
in the future. The major alternative to fossil fuel for the remainder of this century
is nuclear energy." 119 CONG. REC. H2889 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1973) (President's mes-
sage on energy resources). One particular program, the development of the so-called
"fast breeder reactor," serves to highlight the expected promise and problems in this
area. The concept of the breeder reactor is fairly simple; it produces, through "breed-
ing" within the reactor, new nuclear fuel while using other fuel to produce power. The
adjective "fast" refers to the fact that the particles (neutrons) which are produced in-
side the reactor move faster than in an ordinary reactor. This whole process sounds
rather fantastic and has been referred to by the Supreme Court of the United States
as "a sort of modern alchemy." Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of
Electrical Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 399 (1961). Environmental issues concerning the
fast breeder reactor program were recently litigated in Scientists' Institute for Public
Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit noted in its opinion that the breeder
reactor program has 'been given highest national priority in the style of the space pro-
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sible accidents involving radioactive materials and, consequently, to an in-
crease in tort claims. An interesting sidelight is that any imprudent haste
to make greater use of nuclear power because of the exigencies of the en-
ergy crisis could easily exacerbate the problem. Second, the comprehensive
treatise 6 covering the overall subject of radiation and tort law was written
in 1959, and the major exhaustive treatment of preconception injuries7 was
published over ten years ago. Significant changes in both technology and
the law have occurred since then, making further analysis appropriate.8
The subject of preconception, or genetic injuries resulting from radiation
is one of particular interest.9 This Comment examines the problems of tort
law posed by such injuries, both in the historical and contemporary contexts.
Technical developments are touched upon to the extent necessary, and refer-
ences to the technical literature are given. The objective, however, is to
avoid an overly technical discussion of this admittedly technical area. Pos-
sible solutions to the legal issues are analyzed, keeping in mind a goal of
"creative continuity,"10 and a limited forecast of future developments is
made.
gram and quoted -the President's remarks that the program provides "our best hope for
meeting the Nation's growing demand for economical clean energy." Id. at 1084.
This decision illustrates the emphasis on nuclear power development and the concomi-
tant impact on our lives which may be expected from this development.
6. AToMs.
7. Estep & Forgotson, supra note 1. Preconception injuries are those injuries
which an individual receives as a result of damage to the genetic structure of one or
both of his parents (or other ancestor) prior to his conception. These changes in the
genetic structure are commonly called mutations and evidence of the injury to the de-
scendant may not show up for several years or several generations. C. THORNBURN, Iso-
TOPES AND RADIATION IN BIOLOGY 204 (1972). In this Comment, the terms "preconcep-
tion injuries" and "genetic injuries" are used interchangeably to denote the injury to the
subsequent generation; technically, of course, the person actually irradiated suffers "ge-
netic damage," but the harmful effects do not really show up until the subsequent genera-
tion. Preconception injuries thus can be said to occur before there is any separate exist-
ence whatsoever of the individual. This is to be distinguished from the cases of prenatal
injury, discussed infra at notes 127-44 and accompanying text, in which the child is
present as a separate entity within its mother's womb.
8. See generally A. TOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK (1970) for an interesting, popular
work which illustrates what a difference even ten years of technological change can
mean under contemporary conditions.
9. Other major long-term radiation injuries include "leukaemia and other malig-
nant diseases, cataracts, skin damage, impaired fertility, and ageing, i.e. premature death
not attributable to specific causes." C. THORNBURN, supra note 7, at 204. However,
preconception injuries are probably the most difficult to deal with in the legal context,
and they, even more than other radiation injuries, strain traditional tort law to its lim-
its. Such a legal problem is more than merely hypothetical. In a recent federal dis-
trict court case, Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 961(W.D. Okla. 1972), the complaint alleged that birth control pills had altered the
chromosome structure of the mother's body to produce a Mongoloid deformity in her
issue. The court dismissed the complaint, holding that the children, Mongoloid twins,
one of whom was deceased, could not recover for malformations caused by injury to
the ovum of the mother prior to conception. On appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit vacated and remanded, the court being convinced that
"the Oklahoma courts would afford an opportunity to present a case on these allega-
tions." Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, Inc., 483 F.2d 237, 241 (10th Cir.
1973). (Although the alleged cause of injury was a chemical one rather than radia-
tion, it seems clear that the same result would have been reached regardless of the
source of injury.) Permanent genetic damage from radiation has been alleged in at
least one unreported federal district court case. Troxell v. Bendix Corp., C.A. No.
12660, Fed. D.C. W.D. Mo., tried Jan. 28, 1963, deadlocked jury Feb. 14, 1963, cited
in Estep & Forgotson, supra note 1, at 1 n.2.
10. See Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARv. L. REV. 463
(1962): "Any legal system, to remain viable over a span of time, must have the flex-
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I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT: THE LEGAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL MILIEU
A. Recognition of the Preconception Injury Problem in the Law
The special legal problems associated with nuclear energy have long been
recognized," and the area has been described as "one of -the remaining fron-
tiers of development in the law.' 2  The specific problem of preconception
injuries has also been recognized for some time, although it has not been
discussed to the same extent that other radiation issues have been, despite
the fact that it is conceivably the most difficult and disturbing of the possible
injuries.13  It has been suggested that discussion has been avoided by many
"for fear that people will be frightened away from considering some of the
other problems admittedly important to the development of a nuclear indus-
try.' 1 4  Coverage in the literature has tended to reach the point of posing
the questions without detailed discussion of the possible answers. 5 How-
ever, that discussion of the problems which has been advanced has often
been accompanied by predictions of greatly expanded tort litigation in the
future. 16
ibility to admit change. To find solutions for a succession of differing problems in
a continuously changing context, it must be creative. . . . Creativity must build upon
a solid foundation of continuity. Modem developments in tort law present acutely the
problems of accommodation of these competing demands for change and stability."
11. A classic early case in which the unique problems associated with delayed ra-
diation injury were apparent is La Porte v. United States Radium Corp., 13 F. Supp.
263 (D.N.J. 1935). In this case the decedent had been a watch dial painter in the
employment of the defendant, using a luminous radioactive compound in the process.
Decedent left the employment in 1920; in 1927 she expressed the belief that she might
have contracted radium poisoning. A definite diagnosis was made in 1930; she brought
a claim in May 1931 and died in June the same year. The two-year New Jersey stat-
ute of limitations was held to bar the action. For a discussion of this and associated
cases see G. HurroN, LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS ON IONIZING RADIATION 35-37 (1966).
The author concludes that the case "in all probability, was correctly decided on strictly
legal principles." Id. at 37. The special tort problems which he envisioned early in
the nuclear era led the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission to note the partic-
ular interests which negligence lawyers were likely to have. Dean, The Impact of the
Atom on Law, 12 U. PITT. L. REV. 514, 515 (1951).
12. ATOMS 200.
13. "The injury to unborn generations caused by irradiation of any potential par-
ent, at least above the very low . . . levels . . . is probably the most disturbing of all
possible radiation injuries." Estep, Radiation Injuries and Statistics: The Need for a
New Approach to Injury Litigation, 59 MICH. L. REv. 259, 265 (1960).
14. Id. at 266.
15. Injuries such as genetic damage and shortening of life span, about
which much has been said in the course of the controversy over weapons
testing, raise serious questions as to what kinds of injuries should, and
what kinds of injuries can practicably, be redressed under our tort system.
Finding the right answers to questions of this kind will require a good
deal of patience and ingenuity on the part of all lawyers.
Murphy, Tort Liability, Government Indemnification and Insurance, in CONFERENCE
ON ATOMIC RADIATION AND THE LAW 10-11 (1961). The particular question here dis-
cussed was used to pique the curiosity of torts students in C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 4 (1969).
16. "There should be a considerable increase in such cases with the expanded use
of radiation. Exposure of potential parents undoubtedly will occur in such amounts
that thereafter in all good conscience they ought to refrain from having children be-
cause of the real danger of genetic mutations." ATOMS 256. "Solutions should be
agreed on before radiation cases begin to occur in considerable numbers." Estep, supra
note 13, at 268. "In any event, now is the time 'to face these problems for radiation
cases, not after greatly expanded use of this new source of energy has created a large
number of cases which the law is ill-equipped to handle." Id. at 304. It is apparent
that the expected number of cases has not materialized. However, for reasons already
[Vol. 28
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Before proceeding, it is necessary to define the relevant legal problems
in more specific terms. These problems become almost obvious when one
considers the ramifications of a tort action in which the plaintiff was not
in any sense in existence at the time of the tortious conduct, and the tor-
tious conduct consisted of the exposure of one of the plaintiff's ancestors to
radiation. 17 There are numerous physical mechanisms by which the ex-
posure may have occurred. At one extreme is the unlikely, but possible,' 8
catastrophe associated with a major nuclear reactor accident.'0  At the
other end of the spectrum are the more feasible possibilities of exposures
from X-ray machines, particle accelerators, and accidents involving trans-
portation, handling, or manufacturing of the nuclear materials.20 A compli-
cating factor to be recognized at this point is that everyone is exposed -to
a certain amount of so-called "background" radiation every day. Expanded
use of nuclear power generating plants will inevitably increase the handling,
manufacturing, and transportation of nuclear materials and the disposal of
radioactive waste products, with a consequent increase in the possibility of
accidents. There are other potential mechanisms for radiation exposure to
the ancestor which are not detailed here.21
The allegation in the type of tort action under consideration is that as
a result of the exposure of an ancestor to radiation, certain alterations oc-
curred in the genetic make-up of the germ, or reproductive cells of that an-
cestor. Consequently, the plaintiff, who was born one or more generations
later, has incurred an injury, for example, a cleft palate, Mongolism, or other
physical deformity. It is also possible that a descendant of the exposed an-
cestor has been born dead as a result of the genetic change, and a wrongful
death action is now being pressed. For the purposes of further analysis,
it is assumed that a wrong has been committed and an injury suffered.
Under the current legal system, this injured plaintiff will face almost insur-
mountable legal problems in seeking recovery.
The most obvious legal problem encountered by this plaintiff is the bar
of the statute of limitations. Unless some special provisions are made for
this type of injury, his action will undoubtedly be barred because the time
noted, this is an appropriate juncture at which to reexamine the problem. See text ac-
companying notes 4-8 supra.
17. The genetic effects of radiation have been recognized since 1927 when it was
discovered that X-rays produced a large increase in the mutation rate -in the fruit fly.
The mutations which occur in the body's reproductive cells are the important ones from
the standpoint of damages to future generations. "When a mutation occurs it may
cause damage in the first generation of children, or, if it is of the type that causes
damage only in a double dose (i.e., is recessive), hundreds of generations may inter-
vene before the damage occurs-and there are all gradations between these extremes."
Crow, Genetic Effects of Radiation, 14 BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 19, 21
(1958).
18. See note 4 supra.
19. "The potential destructive impact of a nuclear power plant catastrophe dwarfs
by many orders of magnitude any other catastrophe which could be imagined as result-
ing from a man-made artifact." Green, The Risk Benefit Calculus in Nuclear Power
Licensing, in NUCLEAR POWER AND THE PUBLIC 125 (H. Foreman ed. 1970).
20. For a more detailed discussion see Unruh, Radiation Emergencies: Types and
Mechanisms, in RADIATION ACCIDENTS AND EMERGENCIES IN MEDICINE, RESEARCH, AND
INDUSTRY 13 (1965).




frame involved can 'be expected easily to exceed the usual one-to-three-year
limitation periods. 22 This problem is not unique to the preconception injury
cases; it occurs in all the serious delayed-effect cases such as cancer or
leukemia.23  Another problem is that of proving that the plaintiff's injury
is in fact a result of the exposure of his ancestor to radiation. Many com-
mentators have considered this to be an insurmountable obstacle under the
current system24 and alternatives have been proposed to help the plaintiff.
25
A -third problem, one which may in fact obviate the others, is that of the
very existence of a cause of action. If one considers that the so-called "un-
born plaintiff," one who was conceived but not yet born at the time of the
injury, has only within the last thirty years been allowed recovery for pre-
natal injuries, 20 it becomes apparent that a major legal change is required
to allow the unconceived plaintiff a cause of action. 27
The result of such difficult problems is likely to be that many persons
who are grievously injured through the fault of others will be denied all re-
tovery. That there are now, or will be such persons seems well settled.
28
This result is questionable because it does not comport with current tort
doctrine.29
Judicial discussion of the genetic damage problem, at least until Jorgen-
sen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, Inc.,3° was largely confined to dictum
in a relatively small number of cases.31 A reading of these cases leads one
22. G. HUTrON, supra note 11, at 35.
23. See id. at 35-44, for a relatively recent discussion of the statute of limitations
problem. For a thorough discussion of these issues, see Estep & Van Dyke, Radiation
Injuries: Statute of Limitations Inadequacies in Tort Cases, 62 MICH. L. REv. 753
(1964). The authors recommend an over-all limitation period of thirty years, and
would apply the period to genetic injuries as well as to other delayed-effect radiation
cases. "Whether or not a cause of action is recognized, the limitation statute . . .
should be applied with the period commencing on the date of the exposure of the ances-
tor. It should be specified that the over-all limitation period cannot be tolled or sus-
pended for any reason other than the failure of the defendant to file the required report
of a nuclear incident." Id. at 793-94.
24. See, e.g., ATOMS 222.
25. See notes 147-60 infra, and accompanying text.
26. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 55, at 335 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
27. The Tenth Circuit's recent opinion in Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laborator-
ies, Inc., 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973), discussed supra note 9, may be significant
in showing the potential for such change. There are two reasons for caution in draw-
ing conclusions from this decision, however. First, the court emphasized that most fa-
vorable consideration must be given the complaint since it was disposed of on a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim in the district court. Second, the court construed
the pleading such that it was not limited to effects or developments before conception.
Id. at 239.
28. "[I]f recovery is denied, we know that many individuals, often through no
fault of their own, will go through life uncompensated for the infirmity, inconvenience,
and financial sacrifice caused by another's actions for which he would be legally liable
but for the lack of an identifiable legal entity and specific proof of causal connection."
Estep & Forgotson. supra note 1, at 46.
29. "The purpose of the law of torts is to adjust these losses, and to afford com-
pensation for injuries sustained by one person as the result of the conduct of another."
PROSSER § 1, at 6, quoting Wright, Introduction to the Law of Torts, 8 CAMB. L.J.
238 (1944).
30. 336 F. Supp. 961 (W.D. Okla. 1972), vacated and remanded, 483 F.2d 237
(10th Cir. 1973).
31. See notes 33-44 infra, and accompanying text. The district court's decision in
Jorgensen was significant in that it involved a holding on the issue (although denying
recovery) rather than dictum.
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to conclude that recovery would probably be denied today, even assuming
that the formidable hurdle of proving causation could be surmounted. The
district court in Jorgensen concluded: "We find no holding by any court
that a child may recover for injury to the sperm of its male parent or the
ovum of its female parent before the two unite in conception. One author-
ity states unqualifiedly that there is none such."1
3 2
One of the early cases with dicta relevant to preconception injuries is
Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co.,33 in which the court abandoned
the criterion that a child had to be quick 34 at the time of the prenatal injury
in order to recover. One member of the court expressed disapproval of this
holding, and stated his particular concern that extension of the new rule
might lead -to recovery for preconception injuries: "If a baby can sue for
injuries sustained five seconds after conception, as the majority rules, why
not allow such suits for injuries before conception, even unto third and
fourth generations?" 35  Other language in the special concurring opinion
helps to illuminate the preconception injury problem:
The ruling of the majority in this case extends [the quickening cri-
terion] to allow the child to maintain a suit for damages to the cell
from which it came, even though the cell had been conceived ten sec-
onds. It ignores reality and fact. It simply by-passes the inflexible
rule of law that for one to maintain a suit for personal injury, the injury
must be either to the person of the suer or that of a relative or one
upon whom he is dependent. This indispensable requisite is completely
absent here. The cell is not the person of anyone, and whether it be-
comes such is dependent upon the processes of nature which raises it
from a mere cell to a human being.36
Although speaking in terms of a viability criterion rather than a quicken-
ing criterion, a similar distinction has been proposed as a desirable basis for
denial of recovery for preconception injuries from radiation:
By holding that a cause of action accrues when the injury or disease
might reasonably have been discovered, one opens the door to lawsuits
based on mutations which may occur two or even three generations af-
ter the ancestor was exposed to radiation. While the descendant may
have a legitimate claim against the defendant for the injury to his an-
cestor, it is felt that the trial of such a claim would be unwarranted
In an effort to insure that such very stale claims will not frustrate
the primary purpose of the statute of limitations, it is suggested that
32. 336 F. Supp. at 962. The authority to which the court alludes is 9 AM. JUR.
Proof of Facts Prenatal Injuries 523-24 (1961). It is interesting to note that the Tenth
Circuit's decision in Jorgensen may invalidate this assertion; however, see note 27 supra
for discussion of the reasons for caution in drawing conclusions from the Tenth Circuit
opinion.
33. 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956).
34. The "quickening" criterion has reference to the first movements of the fetus
felt in the mother's uterus. This occurs on the average at about the sixteenth week
of pregnartcy. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY Q-2 (9th ed. 1963). The
other commonly used criterion for recovery for prenatal injuries was that the child had
to be "viable" at the time of the injury, i.e., the child must be capable of living on
its own; this occurs at about seven months. Id. at V-17.
35. 93 S.E.2d at 729.
36. Id. (emphasis added).
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the test which was laid down by the Ohio Supreme Court in the case
of Williams v. The Marion Rapid Transict District, Inc., 152 Ohio St.
114, 87 N.E.2d 334, (1949), might be adopted. The court distin-
guished between a viable and a nonviable foetus, the former having
a cause of action. If the cause of action for radiation poisoning were
similarly limited to persons 'in being,' the problem of liability for muta-
tions would conceivably be eliminated.3 7
Another of the few cases to touch upon preconception injuries is Morgan
v. United States,38 a federal district court case which was decided in the
same year as Hornbuckle. In Morgan the allegation was made that an in-
fant was injured as a result of a negligent blood transfusion to his mother.
The transfusion was alleged to have occurred in February 1953, while the
infant was not born until June 1955. The court took judicial notice of the
nine-month human gestation period, then concluded that no action accrued
to the infant who was not a viable fetus or even in its mother's womb at
the time of the tortious conduct.3 9
This case has been cited as "very likely to be the forerunner of many
cases that will be brought to the courts as the result of extensive use of
radioactive materials."'40  However, this prediction has fortunately not
materialized. Reference is made in the literature to at least one case (which
reached the trial stage) in which permanent genetic damage from radiation
was alleged. 41
A widely discussed case which has relevance here is Zepeda v. Zepeda,42
which has been described as a suit for "wrongful life."48 The suit was by
a minor against his father for damages because -the plaintiff had been born
illegitimate. The Appellate Court of Illinois in a thorough opinion recog-
nized that a wrong had been committed but declined to allow recovery be-
cause of the potentially sweeping results envisioned. The court concluded
that any such creation of a new tort should be undertaken by the legisla-
ture. The court alluded specifically to the possibility of preconception in-
juries from radiation:
So let us go still further and take a third suppositive case, where the
wrongful act also takes place before conception but the injury attaches at
the moment of conception. Physicists and geneticists declare that ther-
monuclear radiation can so affect the reproductive cells of future par-
37. McNeal, Bloom, Christovich, Cope, Cull & DeJarnette, The Statute of Limita-tions Problem in Relation to Atomic Energy Liability, 26 INS. COUNSEL J. 347, 350(1959). Whether this reasoning can be sustained on the basis of more recent prenatal
cases is discussed in text accompanying notes 135-39 infra. See Wolfe v. Isbell, 280
So. 2d 758 (Ala. 1973), for a very recent case in which the viability criterion is re-jected.
38. 143 F. Supp. 580 (D.N.J. 1956).
39. Id. at 584. In support of its statement that no cause of action accrued under
Pennsylvania law, the court cited a 1940 Pennsylvania case which had denied recovery
for prenatal cases in general.
40. ATOMS 226.
41. Troxell v. Bendix Corp., C.A. No. 12660, Fed. D.C. W.D. Mo., tried Jan. 28,
1963, deadlocked jury Feb. 14, 1963, cited in Estep & Forgotson, supra note 1, at 1
n.2.
42. 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945
(1964).
43. Ploscowe, An Action for "Wrongful Life," 38 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1078 (1963).
[Vol. 28
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ents that their offspring may be born with physical and mental defects.
. . . If a child is born malformed or an imbecile because of the gen-
etic effect on his father and mother of a negligently or intentionally
caused atomic explosion, will he be denied recovery because he was
not in 'being at the time of the explosion? 44
Probably the case of greatest current significance is Jorgensen, in which
the district court concluded that there was simply no cause of action for pre-
conception injuries. 45  The court cited Morgan as being "persuasive." The
plaintiff had apparently emphasized the above statements in Zepeda, but the
court distinguished it because it was not a products liability case. The court
also declined to follow the reasoning of Zepeda because the language relied
on by the plaintiff was dictum, and the court was only an intermediate ap-
pellate court. In a concluding statement the district court said: "Any right
of a child arising out of injury to the chromosome of its mother through
the use of such pills prior to its conception should be created by the Legis-
lature and not by judicial decision. ' 46  This would not appear to be a satis-
factory answer. As Professor Keeton has noted in his classic article on
"creative continuity":
Unhampered by a rigid theory of precedent like that adhered to in Eng-
land, American courts have a great responsibility for participating in
the creative adaptation of law to current needs. Though some types
of reform are beyond the judicial function, primarily because of the dis-
tinctive investigating facilities of legislatures and their distinctive role
in relation to reforms of comprehensive character, it is never a satis-
factory answer to an argument for judicial creativity that the need for
change is one that could be accomplished by statute.47
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit vacated and remanded in
Jorgensen,48 recognizing that the district court had not satisfactorily resolved
the matter. The court specifically stated that "the trial court was incorrect
in concluding that recognition of such a cause of action must await legislative
action."'49 The court pointed to the common law developments in the area
of prenatal injuries in support of this conclusion.50 The court's language
appears to support recognition of a cause of action for preconception in-
juries: "We are persuaded that the Oklahoma courts would treat the prob-
lem of the injuries alleged here as one of causation and proximate cause,
to be determined by competent medical proof."'" The significance of this
language is reduced because it can be considered as dictum. The court was
44. 190 N.E.2d at 854. Although it is not entirely clear, the court seems to be
implying that recovery should be allowed in such a situation. The court says later in
the opinion that it is not very important that the plaintiff is not a "person" as historic-
ally understood in the law of torts. The court is "not concerned with some abstract
ontological proposition as to the instant a human entity becomes a person." 190 N.E.
2d at 855.
45. 336 F. Supp. at 962-63.
46. Id.
47. Keeton, supra note 10, at 484 (emphasis added).
48. 483 F.2d 237 (10thCir. 1973).
49. Id. at 240.
50. Id. at 241.
51. Id. at 240.
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considering the complaint most favorably because it was dismissed by the
trial court on a motion to dismiss, and the court concluded that the plead-
ing could be construed so as not to be limited to "effects or developments
before conception." 52
Much attention in this area has been focused on the difficult problems
of proof of causation53 and the statute of limitations problems associated
with the delayed effects of radiation. 54  There are conflicting views as to
whether existing legal principles are even capable of meeting these chal-
lenges. One commentator has said: "The advent of the Atomic Age will
scarcely cause a ripple on the even surface of the principles of tort liability.
Lawyers can rely with confidence on all the familiar doctrines and precepts.
This will remain unchanged."55 More recently, in the workmen's compensa-
tion context, it has been concluded that: "Radiation injuries are not now
sufficiently numerous to justify special methods of compensation, and until
our society is prepared to make more comprehensive changes in disability
compensation we should endeavor to apply intelligently the old rules in this
new area. They are not inadequate for -the just resolution of the prob-
lems." 56 A contrary conclusion is that "the present system must be modified
when applied to radiation injuries." 57  Similarly, it has been concluded that
the present system cannot meet these problems and that "[t]he means and
guidelines for correcting the legal system must be worked out by the coop-
erative efforts of the legal profession, the medical profession, industrial hy-
gienists and health physicists."5 s
Evaluation of these polar views and conclusions as to what should be done
depend on an analysis of technological and legislative factors and certain
common law developments. In dealing with preconception injuries in parti-
cular, it is important to keep in mind the admonition that "[s]ome imagina-
tive thinking is indicated." 59
B. The Technological Setting
Mention has already been made of the expanded future use of nuclear
energy and technological developments in that field. This section focuses
on the technological developments which more directly affect the legal prob-
lem of proof of causation of genetic injuries from radiation. 60 Attention is
also given to a related technical issue, the assessment of the probable num-
52. Id. at 239.
53. See, e.g., Keyes & Horvath, Approaches to Liability for Remote Causes: the
Low Level Radiation Example, 56 IowA L. REV. 531 (1971); O'Toole, Radiation,
Causation, and Compensation, 54 GEO. L.J. 751 (1966).
54. See, e.g., Estep & Van Dyke, supra note 23.
55. Becker & Huard, Tort Liability and the Atomic Energy Industry, 44 GEo. L.J.
58 (1955).
56. O'Toole, supra note 53, at 776.
57. Estep & Forgotson, supra note 1, at 46.
58. Forgotson, The Significance of Health Physics Testimony in Radiation Injury
Litigation, 9 HEALTH PHorsics 741, 745 (1963).
59. ATOMS 30.
60. For an interesting, recent treatment of genetic technology and the law gener-
ally, see Green, Genetic Technology: Law and Policy for the Brave New World, 48
IND. L.J. 559 (1973).
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ber of persons who are likely to be affected by the resolution (or lack of
resolution) of the legal problems.
If the factual assumptions are made (1) that the plaintiff's ancestor was
in fact exposed to damaging radiation through the fault of the defendant,
and (2) that the plaintiff-descendant was subsequently born with a defect
of the type which is associated with radiation-induced genetic injuries, then
an analysis can be made of the severe problem of proving the causal link
between the two events. It has been concluded that in most cases proof
of causation under classic tests will be impossible: "[I]t can be asserted
safely that on the basis of the present state of medical, scientific, and genetic
knowledge, -the causal connection between a specific radiation exposure and
a particular genetic injury is not capable of clear medical proof in the nor-
mal legal sense of the term."'61 The difficulty of the proof problem arises
from the statistical nature of the injury: "Delayed radiation effects, in gen-
eral, are a probability phenomenon. Although they can be demonstrated
on a statistically significant basis with a sufficiently large population group,
the presence or absence of these effects in any given individual may be im-
possible to establish."'6 2  In other words, it is possible to show that "if a
group of sufficient size is exposed to radiation a larger number of offspring
born to this group of individuals will have these diseases or defects than
would be expected from the spontaneous rate; there is no way to determine
specific causation in any one case."'63  Compounding the problems of proof
is the fact that radiation does not produce new kinds of genetic defects but
merely increases the frequency of gene mutations which occur naturally.6 1
Despite these obvious difficulties, there has been considerable optimism
about improvements in scientific knowledge so as to allow proof of causa-
tion.65  However, it appears that the millenium has not yet arrived. Al-
though much progress has been made, the same problems exist today and
are likely to continue.60  The statistical nature of the injury cannot be
61. Estep & Forgotson, supra note 1, at 45.
62. Powell, Effects of Radiation on Man, 12 VAND. L. B1.EV. 81, 91 (1958).
63. Estep & Forgotson, supra note 1, at 46-47.
64. P. EARLY, M. RAZZAK & D. SODEE, TExTBooK OF NUCLEAR MEDICINE AND
TECHNOLOGY 119 (1969). For a thorough, highly technical discussion of the relevant
genetic concepts, see Estep & Forgotson, supra note 1, at 3-26. For a more current,
exhaustive discussion of the effects of radiation on genetic structure, see C. BEHRENS,
E. KING & J. CARPENDER, ATOMIC MEDICINE 350-435 (1969).
65. "[W]ithin the next few years much more will be known about the possible gen-
etic contribution radiation mutations will make for many other types of injuries ...."
Estep & Forgotson, supra note 1, at 47. "[A]s our knowledge of radiation exposure
and genetic damage increases, it may well prove possible to satisfy the causation-in-
fact requirement." ATOMS 203. There is also optimism as to the ability of the law
itself to cope with the proof problem: "The problem of proof is, of course, peculiar
to the given situation. The ingenuity of the advocate and the master of us all, the
law, will combine, as they have in the past, to overcome this rather serious obstacle."
Dooley, Nuclear Energy-An Evaluation from the Viewpoint of the Public Weal, 1971
ABA SECT. INS., NEG. & COMP. LAW 272, 285.
66. "In spite of the tremendous advances in our knowledge of genetics in recent
years, no significant change has occurred in the underlying concepts upon which the
medical uses of radiation with regard to genetics are based. This new information has
reemphasized the far reaching effect of genetic damage which may occur to individuals
and their progeny who are exposed to radiation." C. BEHRENS, E. KING & J. CARPEN-
DEi, supra note 64, at 429. See generally USAEC DIVIsION OF TECHNICAL INFORMA-
TION, BIOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE NuCLEAR AGE (1969).
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avoided, and there is a lack of sufficient genetic data on man. "The gen-
erations for man are too long and the 'experiments,' if they could be done
at all, are too costly and too time-consuming for us to have any considerable
fund of information on the effects of radiation on genetic processes in man
himself. ' '67 Considerable research with insects and animals has been con-
ducted, but extrapolations to man must be done with caution.6s
In view of these technological shortcomings in the ability to prove causa-
tion, the question that should be addressed is whether the problem is worthy
of further legal consideration at all. Should the law attempt to accommo-
date this difficult problem? The second technological consideration is rele-
vant in answering this question, that is, the assessment of the potential mag-
nitude of the problem.
There is no doubt that radiation exposure does cause genetic damage; 69
that there will be greatly expanded use of radiation sources in the future;70
and that the number of persons likely to be afflicted with genetic injuries
is significant. One of the most alarming recent estimates is one based not
on accidental overexposure to radiation but rather on exposure to allowable
levels under federal regulations:
How serious are the genetic effects of radiation? No one knows! It
is possible that exposure to the present allowable levels could result in
a 5% to 50% increase in the death rate, producing some 150,000 to
1,500,000 additional deaths each year in a future population of
300,000,000 people. Moreover, the evidence suggests that there would
be (over and above the fatal diseases) a 5% to 50% increase in such
crippling diseases as diabetes, rheumatoid arthritis, and schizophrenia. 71
This is admittedly an extreme view of the problem. However, when one
considers such estimates, along with the certain increase in the various uses
of nuclear energy and the large number of persons that would be affected
by a single catastrophic reactor accident, then it is reasonable to conclude
that the issue is worthy of consideration. Unless the legal system can find
a solution, there will probably be a large number of individuals who "will
go through life uncompensated for the infirmity, inconvenience, and finan-
cial sacrifice caused by another's actions . . . . Their loss will be no less
painful, costly, or real because the impact occurred before conception."'72
67. Stannard, Evaluation of Health Hazards in the Public Associated With Nuclear
Power Plant Operations, in NUCLEAR POWER AND THE PUBLIC, supra note 19, at 99.
68. P. EARLY, M. RAzzAK & D. SODEE, supra note 64, at 118-19. See also A.
TAMPLIN & J. GOFMAN, 'POPULATION CONTROL' THROUGH NUCLEAR POLLUTION 24(1970).
69. C. BEHRENS, E. KING & J. CARPENDER, supra note 64, at 350.
70. See text accompanying notes 4-5 supra.
71. A. TAMPLIN & J. GOFMAN, supra note 68, at 27. This is in the context of
criticism of allowable radiation exposure guidelines. Accidental exposures to greater
amounts of radiation would increase the effect since the frequency of mutations is pro-
portional to dose. Eisenbrud, Standards of Radiation Protection and Their Implicationsfor the Public's Health, in NUCLEAR POWER AND THE PUBLIC, supra note 19, at 77. See
generally C. THORNBURN, supra note 7, at 204-06. More optimistic assessments exist;
see, e.g., P. EARLY, M. RAzzAK & D. SODEE,'supra note 64, at 119; BIOLOGICAL IMPLI-
CATIONS OF THE NUCLEAR AGE, supra note 66, at 307.




The district court in Jorgensen suggested that any relief for the plaintiff
in preconception injury cases should come from the legislature.78 Thus, it
is appropriate to examine significant legislative developments which might
have an impact on the preconception injury issues. Generally, of course,
the law of tort is common law. Nuclear energy and radiation, however, are
areas which are extensively regulated by statute, so it is particularly impor-
tant to take statutory law into consideration.
Before an examination of the applicable United States statutes, a brief
discussion of two British statutes is instructive. The Nuclear Installations
(Licensing and Insurance) Act of 195974 imposed a statutory duty on the
operators of nuclear installations to insure that no ionizing radiations "cause
any hurt to any person or any damage to any property, whether that person
or property is on the site or elsewhere." 75  The Act did not explicitly make
it a tort to violate the duty, although it would undoubtedly be a tort based
on a statutory duty76 by virtue of which liability would be absolute, requiring
neither intentional nor negligent conduct on the licensee's part.77
The scope of this duty vis-A-vis genetic damage has 'been stated as
follows:
It might happen that ionising [sic] radiations would have caused ge-
netic changes in persons neither born nor even conceived at the time
when the parent was exposed to the radiations; for instance, their fertil-
ity or life expectancy or resistance to disease might have been reduced
in consequence of the mutated genes. It may safely be said that those
not even conceived at the time when the wrong was committed would
not have been able to sue in ordinary torts. Yet the answer might have
been different under the Act. The Act imposed a duty to any person;
it did not require that the hurt be sustained when the radiations were
emitted; moreover . . . it contemplated actions being brought even
thirty years later. These factors lend support to -the view that (if it
could be proved) persons not conceived at the time of the occurrence
could eventually have sued for genetic harmful mutations suffered by
them.78
Thus, this Act arguably changed the British common law rule of no cause
of action for preconception injuries caused by radiation.
The Act was substantially amended by the Nuclear Installations (Amend-
ment) Act of 1965, 79 and the two Acts were consolidated in the Nuclear
Installations Act of 1965.80 The amendment has been criticized for not
clarifying the duties owed to unborn persons or persons not conceived at
73. 336 F. Supp. at 962-63. The Tenth Circuit disagreed on this point. See text
accompanying note 49 supra.
74. 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 46.
75. Id. § 4. See H. STREET & F. FRAME, LAW RELATING TO NUCLEAR ENERGY
33-34 (1966) [hereinafter cited as STREET & FRAME].
76. STREET & FRAME 34.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 36-37 (emphasis added).
79. Nuclear Installations (Amendment) Act 1965, c. 6.
80. Nuclear Installations Act 1965, c. 65.
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the time of the occurrence. Under the new Act, "it is possible, but far from
being certain, that [the latter] may be able to sue within the limitation
period for genetic harmful mutations suffered by them in consequence of
their parents' having been exposed to ionising [sic] radiations." 81  Thus, it
is arguable that these Acts have conferred a cause of action for preconcep-
tion injuries, at least for those injuries which manifest themselves within the
thirty-year statute of limitations period. 82 This period, which runs from the
date of the defendant's act, in essence strikes a balance between the interests
of the plaintiff who may suffer delayed effects such as genetic damage or
cancer, and the interests of the defendant in not facing stale claims.83 How-
ever, even this extended limitations period certainly does not provide relief
for all genetic injuries which may occur. The claim is barred after thirty
years even though the harm may have been undiscoverable during that
period.84 In addition, the plaintiff still faces the major problem of proving
causation and must meet the ordinary civil standards of burden of proof.85
The British statutes are of interest because of their similarity to the United
States statute which now, in effect, establishes absolute liability for nuclear
power catastrophes. 86 Before discussing the details of this legislation, it is
necessary to cover briefly the background of federal atomic energy legisla-
tion. 8
7
The original Atomic Energy Act of 194688 established the Atomic Energy
Commission and established the framework for development, control, and
use of atomic energy.8 9 The Atomic Energy Act of 195490 revised and
superseded the 1946 Act, made possible private participation in nuclear
power,91 and empowered the Commission to prescribe rules and health and
safety requirements. 92  Probably the most important federal statute relevant
to this discussion is the Price-Anderson Act of 195793 which amended the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954. This legislation encouraged the development
of nuclear power by providing indemnity to any person who might be liable
as a result of a nuclear incident.9 4 Licensing is required, and the licensee
must carry liability insurance in the maximum amount available from pri-
vate sources. 95 A second important provision was the requirement that the
81. STREET & FRAME 54.
82. Nuclear Installations Act 1965, c. 65, § 14(1).
83. STREET & FRAME 67.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 68.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n) (1970); see Green, Nuclear Power: Risk, Liability, and
Indemnity, 71 MIcr. L. REv. 479, 496 (1973).
87. For a thorough treatment of the relevant history of the Atomic Energy Act
see generally Green, supra note 86, at 479-510.
88. Act of Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755.
89. Green, supra note 86, at 479.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 2011-2282 (1970).
91. Id. § 2131-2140.
92. Id. § 2035, 2051, 2201; see Dooley, supra note 65, at 276.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1970); see Green, The Insurance Umbrella, TRIAL, Jan.-
Feb. 1974, at 29.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(c) (1970).
95. This was $60 million in 1957 and applied to facilities with a rated capacity
of 100,000 electrical kilowatts or more. This was subsequently increased to $95 million
by 1972, although aggregate liability remains the same at $560 million. Green, supra
note 86, at 487, 498.
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licensee enter into an agreement with the Commission in which the Comis-
sion agreed to indemnify and hold harmless the licensee and other persons
indemnified in -the amount of five hundred million dollars.96  A ceiling on
the aggregate amount of liability was created which was equal to the amount
of indemnity plus the amount of private financial protection, that is, five
hundred sixty million dollars in 1957.97 In essence, then, the nuclear indus-
try was insulated from any possible liability that was not covered by the
insurance and indemnity arrangements.9"
The most significant facet of the legislation from the standpoint of precon-
ception injuries was the fact that neither -the indemnification nor insurance
coverage applied unless persons were found liable under the applicable state
law.99 Thus, if no cause of action existed under state law, the elaborate
system would be of little assistance to the injured plaintiff. 100  Changes to
the Act were then considered because of the potential problems which a
claimant might have in establishing liability. The possibility of creating a
federal tort based on absolute liability for nuclear power catastrophes was
considered and rejected. Instead, new legislation was passed which provides
for a system of waivers of defenses. The waivers are to be contained in
indemnity agreements and may be required by the Commission to be incor-
porated in insurance policies or contracts. The net effect of the waivers
is to establish absolute liability."0' Specifically waived are:
(i) any issue or defense as to conduct of the claimant or fault of per-
sons indemnified, (ii) any issue or defense as to charitable or govern-
mental immunity, and (iii) any issue or defense based on any statute
of limitations if suit is instituted within three years from the date on
which the claimant first knew, or reasonably could have known, of his
injury or damage and the cause thereof, but in no event more than
ten years after the date of the nuclear incident. 0 2
By waiving defenses rather than establishing a federal tort or cause of action,
this statute is inadequate where no cause of action exists under state law.
In addition, the waivers do not apply to all cases of nuclear incident but
only to "extraordinary nuclear occurrences."'01 3  Thus, the waivers do not
solve the problem of precohception injuries.10 4  Even the extended statute
of limitations would be of no assistance where there was no original cause
of action under state law. The United States statute is thus distinguishable
96. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(c) (1970).
97. Id. § 2210(e).
98. Green, supra note 86, at 489.
99. Id. at 488.
100. "Neither genetic injury nor life-shortening is presently adequately cognizable in
American courts as giving rise to liability." Green, supra note 86, at 495. Green also
notes: "The genetic effects of radiation have generally been ignored by the AEC and
the Joint Committee in their pronouncements on nuclear power plant hazards." Id. at
495 n.77.
101. Green, supra note 86, at 496.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(1) (1970).
103. See Green, supra note 86, at 497.
104. "The difficult problem of proving a causal link between a nuclear incident and
delayed radiation injury remains, as does the problem of financial compensation for
genetic injury ...... Green, supra note 86, at 498 (emphasis added).
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from the British statutes' °5 in which a statutory duty was explicitly created;
here, the statute goes to the defenses rather than to the duty or cause of
action itself.
Also important in federal statutory considerations are the extensive regu-
lations which have been promulgated pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954.106 Detailed standards for protection against radiation have been
established by the regulations10 7 which set permissible levels of radiation but
caution that licensees should "make every reasonable effort to maintain
radiation exposures, and releases of radioactive materials in effluents to un-
restricted areas, as far below the limits specified . . . as practicable."' 08
The regulations make provisions for injunctive relief, civil penalties for viola-
tions, and criminal punishment for willful violations. 1 9
The standards" are relevant to tort liability when consideration is given
to negligence per se and breach of statutory duty. Tort liability based upon
violation of statute is well known in the law."' A great majority of the
courts hold that an unexcused violation of a statute, once it is determined
to be "applicable," is conclusive on the negligence issue. 1 2  A minority of
courts holds such violation to be only evidence of negligence.' Generally,
compliance with a statute or administrative regulations does not necessarily
lead to an inference that there is no negligence. 1 4 The same rules would
seem to be as applicable with regard to radiation standards as with other
regulations, i.e., compliance with governmental radiation regulations "should
be accepted as evidence of having acted reasonably but should not be used
as conclusive proof because there are too many variables in such a rapidly
developing field."' 15
The implications for the plaintiff in a preconception injury case are signi-
ficant. If the injured plaintiff's ancestors were not exposed to any levels
105. See text accompanying notes 74-85 supra.
106. Provision is made for "coordination of the development of radiation standards
for the guidance of Federal agencies and cooperation with the States." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2021(a)(5) (1970).
107. 10 C.F.R. §§ 20.1-.601 and appendices (1973).
108. Id. § 20.1(c).
109. Id. § 20.601.
110. There is debate as to the adequacy of the radiation guidelines in their relation
to genetic damages. One estimate is that "the Atomic Energy Commission's standards
of permissible exposure would increase the natural rate of mutation over 10%. Over
a period of generations, the health cost of these additional mutations would be about
$10 billion a year." A. TAMPLIN & J. GOFMAN, supra note 68, at 4. See text accom-
panying notes 71-72 supra. Of course, one must keep in mind the consideration that
any radiation standard necessarily involves "a judgment based on the balancing of soci-
ety's interest in the rapid development of this promising new field against the known
fact that injuries to specific persons and genetic damage generally are an almost inevit-
able result of any use of radiation." ATOMS 125.
111. See PROSSER § 36, at 190. For a specific discussion of the civil aspects of reg-
ulations and statutory standards with regard to nuclear energy, see G. HUTTON, supra
note 11, at 80-82.
112. PROSSER § 36, at 200. See cases cited at id. § 36 n.20, at 200. "Applicabil-
ity" means that the statute has been interpreted as "designed to protect the class of
persons in which the plaintiff is included, against the risk of the type of harm which
has in fact occurred as a result of its violation." Id. § 36, at 200.
113. Id. § 36, at 201.
114. Id. § 36, at 203.
115. ATOMS 126. The authors suggest that there are certain situations involving ra-
diation in which compliance should be treated as conclusive proof of non-negligence.
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of radiation greater than allowed by the standards, or if he cannot prove
that they were so exposed, then his chances of recovery would seem to be
nil, even assuming that a cause of action is recognized. By analogy to the
law of workmen's compensation, this conclusion would appear -to be as valid
under a system of strict liability as under a system based on negligence. In
workmen's compensation suits, proof that "the measured exposure has been
within guide standards, unfortunately, has almost always meant a finding
that the claimant's injury or disease, whatever its nature, could not have
been an effect of radiation." 116
The federal statute contains an express provision for cooperation with the
states and coordination in the development of radiation standards. 117 Thus,
a consideration of state statutes at this point is appropriate. At the outset,
it should be noted that the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws has specifically promulgated a Model Nuclear Facilities Li-
ability Act, 118 but no jurisdiction had adopted the Model Act as of 1972. 19
In spite of this, an examination of the Model Act is useful because of its
relevance to -the preconception injury problem. In particular, the problems
faced by the plaintiff in a radiation injury suit are recognized by the Act,
and the Act imposes strict liability on the operator of a nuclear facility "for
an injury arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident.' 120 Provisions
are also made for an extended statute of limitations period. 12  The
language of the Model Act would at first appear broad enough to encompass
the preconception injury problem; 122 however, this expectation appears to
be nullified by section 6, which makes it clear that the Act does not expand
the types of injuries for which damages may otherwise be awarded. 23
Thus, if recovery is denied for these injuries under current state law, re-
covery would also be denied under the Model Act.
State workmen's compensation statutes have been involved in a consider-
able number of radiation injury cases. 124 Such statutes would appear, how-
116. O'Toole, supra note 53, at 761-62. The author also notes a "tendency to award
compensation to a claimant who proves an exposure beyond guide limits even though
his claim is considered in other respects a doubtful one." Id. at 762.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1970).
118. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS 228 (1961) [hereinafter cited as 1961 HANDBOOK].
119. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS 404 (1972).
120. 1961 HANDBOOK 231. "Nuclear incidents" and other terms are defined so as
to limit the Model Act in its application to the more hazardous atomic energy activi-
ties. Id. at 224. Exceptions to the general rule of strict liability are made for injuries
covered by workmen's compensation and for property damages on the site of the nu-
clear facility. MODEL NUCLEAR FACILrTIES LIABILITY ACT § 2 (1961) [hereinafter
cited as MODEL ACT].
121. This covers -three years after the injured person knew or reasonably could have
known the cause of the injury, or ten years from the date of the incident, whichever
first occurs. MODEL ACT § 5. In the prefatory note the commissioners explicitly
state: "Because of the delayed impact of the effects of radiation overexposure, the typi-
cal period of limitations is not apt to be adequate." 1961 HANDBOOK 227.
122. For example, it applies to "an injury arising out of or resulting from a nuclear
incident." MODEL AT § 2. Also, "person" is given a broad definition. MODEL ACT
§ 1(7).
123. MODEL ACT § 6, Comment.
124. See generally O'Toole, supra note 53, for a recent, exhaustive coverage of the
workmen's compensation statutes and their relationship to radiation injuries. See also
Hutton, Workmen's Compensation and Radiation Injury, 12 VAND. L. REv. 145 (1958).
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ever, to be of little benefit to the plaintiff alleging preconception injuries,
even if the exposure of the ancestor was work related, because the plaintiff
is not the employee. Hence, neither the irradiated ancestor (unless he is
otherwise disabled) nor the injured descendant may be able to recover under
workmen's compensation.
Other state statutory provisions which are relevant are the statutes of
limitation which have already been discussed. 125  The general conclusion as
to these statutes is that they make it difficult if not impossible to recover
"many meritorious claims arising from delayed manifestation injuries.' 126
Overall, it appears that current state and federal statutory provisions, and
even such proposed legislation as the Model Act, are inadequate to cover
the preconception injury; it also appears that the tendency of the meager
existing case law on genetic injuries is toward denial of recovery because
there is no cause of action. It is questionable, however, whether this result
is inevitable, especially in view of the common law development of the
rationale underlying the recovery of damages in prenatal or fetal injury cases
over the last twenty-eight years. The conceptually sound premises of these
cases provide a useful analogy which, by extension, may help solve the pre-
conception injury problem.
III. A SIGNIFICANT COMMON LAW DEVELOPMENT:
THE PRENATAL INJURY CASES
It seems that elementary justice requires that recovery be allowed
to the injured in mind or body who come into court and establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that such impairment was
cause by action of the defendant which, had it been toward the
born, would be the basis of recovery.' 27
These words, written in reference to the prenatal injury cases, would seem
on principle to be equally applicable to the preconception injury problem
under consideration. The preconception cases extend the time frame back
before the point of conception, wherein, of course, lies the distinction be-
tween the two situations. It remains to be seen how significant this distinc-
tion is. One prefatory note is that the legal development with regard to
prenatal injuries has been as rapid and as spectacular, and has occurred over
basically the same time period, as the technological development in nuclear
energy. 1
28
The literature is replete with discussions of the prenatal cases; 29 however,
discussion here is limited to a search for answers directly relevant to the
125. See notes 22-23 supra, and accompanying text.
126. Estep & Van Dyke, supra note 23, at 753.
127. White, The Right of Recovery for Prenatal Injuries, 12 LA. L. REV. 383, 390(1952).
128. The time frame for the prenatal injury legal development is basically 1946 to
1967, the year when Texas allowed recovery. Leal v. C.C. Pitts Sand & Gravel, Inc.,419 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. 1967). Prosser describes this development as "up till that time
the most spectacular abrupt reversal of a well settled rule in the whole history of the
law of torts." PROSSER § 55, at 336.
129. See PROSSER § 55 n.22, at 336 for a recent bibliography. See also Estep &
Forgotson, supra note 1, at 28-34; AToMS 236-41.
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preconception injury problem. Dean White's introductory quotation suggests
that there is such relevance. Also, Professor Keeton has noted with ap-
proval -the prenatal case development as an example of creative continuity
in tort law.130 Hopefully, this creative continuity can be achieved with re-
spect to preconception injury as well.
The two principal reasons -that were formerly given by courts for denial
of recovery for prenatal injuries were: "First, that the defendant could owe
no duty of conduct to a person who was not in existence at the time of
his action; and second, that the difficulty of proving any causal connection
between negligence and damage was too great, and there was too much
danger of fictitious claims.'' 1 1  The rule denying recovery in the prenatal
cases was ultimately changed because of a clear recognition, based on medi-
cal knowledge, that there existed a separate legal entity, albeit in its mother's
womb' 3 2 and a recognition that difficulty of proof of causation should not
be an arbitrary basis for completely denying the plaintiff a cause of action.'3 3
If these standards are applied to the preconception case, it is obvious that
it will be impossible to find a separate legal entity, and in fact this has been
discussed as a basis for denial of recovery. 134 Problems of proving causation
are undoubtedly more difficult in the preconception injury cases; but by the
same rationale as in the prenatal cases, this should not be asserted arbitrar-
ily to deny the existence of a cause of action.
The tendency of the prenatal cases has been to extend the point at which
to allow recovery to injuries occurring nearer to conception. The majority
of courts have allowed recovery based on a viability criterion; some have
said that the child must at least have been quick at the time of the injury.'3 5
As a practical matter, almost all jurisdictions have allowed recovery even
though the injury occurrred during the early weeks of pregnancy, when the
fetus was neither viable nor quick.' 3 6 It is perhaps significant that the con-
curring opinion in Hornbuckle 37 opposed this extension, particularly be-
cause of a belief that the reasoning might be extended even further back
to the preconception case.138  Thus, although opposing such extension, this
opinion recognizes the existence of an arguable basis for extension to precon-
ception cases.
One of the most significant aspects of the prenatal cases is that the courts
have been willing to accept scientific and medical proof as to the existence
of the fetus and to discard old rules which denied recovery based on some
arbitrary distinction. It would seem reasonable that the same attitude to-
ward the preconception cases would overcome the arbitrary distinction of
130. Keeton, supra note 10, at 485 n.51.
131. PROSSER § 55, at 335.
132. "mhe unborn child in the path of an automobile is as much a person in the
street as the mother .... "PROSSER § 55, at 336.
133. Id.
134. See note 39 supra, and accompanying text.
135. PROSSER § 55, at 337. See note 34 supra -for an explanation of the distinction
between "quick" and "viable."
136. PROSSER § 55, at 337. For a very recent case, see Wolfe v. Isbell, 280 So.
2d 758 (Ala. 1973), in which the viability distinction is rejected.
1,37. 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727, 728 (1956).
138. 93 S.E.2d at 729.
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"no legal existence" and would result in at least a recognition of a cause
of action: "[The courts] may follow scientific discoveries one step further
and hold that so long as causation can be proved, compensation should be
allowed, even though the radiation causing the abnormality occurred before
conception. '139
On a broader policy basis, a reason for the initial establishment of the
no-recovery rule in the prenatal cases was the novelty of the claim sub-
mitted. There were simply no precedents, certainly none allowing recovery.
Novelty of the claim is of particular relevance to preconception injuries. A
leading opinion denying recovery for prenatal injuries was written by Mr.
Justice Holmes. 140  One factor resulting in denial of recovery was apparently
the lack of precedent. Such a result has been criticized as follows:
[L]ack of precedent, in the sense of there being no favorably decided
case on a fact situation similar in substantial detail to that before the
court, is at most a half reason for denying an action. It is perhaps
much less than that when there is no decision anywhere to the contrary
and there are broad general principles of the common law which point
to allowing such an action. It seems fair to say that this was exactly
the situation in which the Massachusetts court found itself when it came
to decide the Dietrich case. True, there were no cases allowing recov-
ery for injuries sustained by an unborn child. But there was a broad
common law rule which allowed recovery to those who suffered bodily
injury because of the wrongful acts of another.' 4'
This discussion takes on particular significance when one considers that a
primary reason given by the district court for denying a cause of action for
genetic injuries in Jorgensen142 was that the court could find "no holding
by any court that a child may recover for injury to the sperm of its male
parent or the ovum of its female parent before the two unite in concep-
tion."143
All of this is not to say that caution should not be exercised or that a
welfare theory of tort law should be adopted for these cases. The crux of
the matter is that science clearly recognizes that such injuries may occur and
that by analogy to the prenatal cases the law should also recognize their
existence. "If the proof-of-causal connection obstacle can be surmounted
and administrative difficulties can be met the law cannot afford to deny re-
covery for preconception injuries if a child is born and lives with a handicap
created by defendant's radiation source under such circumstances that he
would be liable if conception had already taken place.' 44 As this suggests,
allowance of a cause of action does not solve all of the problems in this
area. Rather, an examination of the spectrum of possible solutions is neces-
sary before forming any conclusions.
139. ATOMS 225.
140. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
141. White, supra note 127, at 390-91.
142. 336 F. Supp. 961 (W.D. Okla. 1972), vacated and remanded, 483 F.2d 237
(10th Cir. 1973).
143. 336 F. Supp. at 962.




Implicit in a discussion of solutions to the preconception injury prob-
lem is a policy decision that this is a type of injury which society desires
to compensate. This initial policy question should be decided without re-
gard to the practical problems of proof. It has been suggested that if diffi-
culty of proof prevents any workable solution now, "recovery should be de-
nied only until scientific advances make it possible. 1 4  It is submitted that
on the basis of the foregoing discussion, the question of preconception in-
juries is potentially serious enough to warrant searching for a solution, and
that a preliminary policy decision in favor of compensating this type of in-
jury is reasonable.
The prenatal cases suggest that at least one approach to a solution is
through the common law recognition of a cause of action. This results in
the plaintiff's being allowed to prove his case rather than simply being de-
nied a cause of action from the outset. However, the problems of proof
of genetic injury are so great in most cases that the plaintiff would still ef-
fectively be denied recovery until scientific advances allow proof of causa-
tion. As has been seen, such developments do not appear likely in the near
future.140
Going beyond the initial policy decision to recognize the injury, three prin-
cipal approaches to solution of the overall problem have been suggested:
(1) imposition of strict liability; (2) extension of the statute of limitations;
and (3) creation of a statistically based contingent injury fund.
Because of the difficulties in proving negligence in a radiation exposure
situation, strict liability has been frequently proposed to assist the plain-
tiff. 1 47 This may be by legislative action, as suggested in the Model Nuclear
Facilities Liability Act;1 48 by a waiver of defenses, as under the federal
Price-Anderson Act; 149 or by extension of absolute liability under the com-
mon law."' °  Under a strict liability rule, causation would clearly become
the true legal issue to be met by the plaintiff.' 5' This is the greatest barrier
facing the plaintiff in a genetic injury case, assuming that he has a cause
of action. Thus, although strict liability could be of great benefit to plaintiffs
in many radiation injury situations, its utility would be somewhat limited in
the genetic injury situation.
Extension of the limitation period offers some hope to the plaintiff. Var-
ious periods have been adopted or proposed in an effort to solve the broader
problems inherent in the delayed-effect radiation injury cases. The thirty-
year period in the British statutes appears to be one of the longest
145. Estep, supra note 13, at 263.
146. See notes 66-68 supra, and accompanying text.
147. Dooley, supra note 65, at 283. See Seavey, Torts and Atoms, 46 CALIF. L.
REV. 3, 9-13 (1958), for an early recommendation. See generally ATOMS 635-724.
See also Cavers, Improving Financial Protection of the Public Against the Hazards of
Nuclear Power, 77 HARV. L. REV. 644 (1964). Cavers argues strongly for strict liabil-
ity based on the "sheer fairness of such a rule." Id. at 664.
148. See note 120 supra, and accompanying text.
149. See notes 101-102 supra, and accompanying text.
150. See ATOMS 684-86. The authors place more emphasis on a statutory solution
than on a common law solution.
151. Cavers, supra note 147, at 670.
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adopted. 15 2 The Model Nuclear Facilities Liability Act provides for a maxi-
mum ten-year period.'5 8  This has been specifically criticized as "unrealistic
in view of current scientific knowledge of the delayed biological effects of
nuclear radiation. '154  Other periods have been proposed, generally calling
for an overall limit together with a reasonable period after acquisition of
knowledge of the injury in which to bring action.155 Although these are
likely to help many radiation victims such as the plaintiff in LaPorte v.
United States Radium Corp.,156 the preconception injury victim is still parti-
cularly faced with the problem of proving causation, and he may be barred
even under the extended limitations period because the injury may not mani-
fest itself for more than one generation. However, the interests of these
claimants must be balanced against the interests of defendants who must
counter these extremely stale claims. It appears that thirty years is a rea-
sonable limitation even for genetic injuries, and should provide at least some
relief for the next generation.
The factor which particularly compounds the difficulties in the genetic in-
jury cases is the statistical nature of the injury. With a sufficiently large
exposed population, it is possible to say -that a significant number will be
injured, but not to identify particular individuals who will be injured. A real-
istic solution must necessarily take this factor into consideration. Probably
the most promising solution which has been proposed is the creation of a
"contingent injury fund,"'157 the basic theory of which is fairly simple:
[O]nce the fact and amount of irradiation and the responsibility for
it are determined, however this is done, all of the defendants who irrad-
iate others would contribute in proportion to the increased chances of
some latent disease created by the radiation exposure legally charged to
them . . . . [T]he fund should be sufficient to permit compensation
of each exposed person who actually contracts the disease later. Those
who are exposed but do not get the disease would recover nothing and
the contributions made for them would be used to compensate fully
those who do. This permilts the law to provide compensation only for
those who are damaged and to make a fair charge to each defendant
based on 'the increased risk caused 'by him.'15 8
The important result as far as the victim is concerned is that his problems
of proof of causation are greatly diminished: "When the victim gets
leukemia, for example, he would recover fully merely upon proof that he
has the disease. Biological causation for his specific case would not have
to be proved either at the initial determination of the fact of exposure and
value of the injury should it occur, or at the time of onslaught of the
disease."' 159 This has been described as the "only fair solution to a legal
152. See note 82 supra, and accompanying text.
153. See note 121 supra, and accompanying text.
154. Estep & Van Dyke, supra note 23, at 790.
155. See, e.g., ATOMS 724, where a twenty-year over-all limitation period is pro-
posed.
156. 13 F. Supp. 263 (D.N.J. 1935); see note 11 supra.
157. See generally Estep, supra note 13, at 281-98 for a thorough discussion of the
concept.




problem which is definitely emerging as the nuclear age progresses."'u 0 It
obviously requires a rather complicated legislative approach, however, which
would represent a significant departure in the law. Perhaps the stimulus
for legislatures to address such questions will be increased as nuclear energy
uses increase, and some proposal similar to this will be adopted. The real
significance of such proposals and their concomitant discussion, however, is
that the problem is at least recognized in the legal community, and the appli-
cation of a scientifically based solution is considered.
V. CONCLUSION AND FORECAST
It should be clear from the foregoing discussion that the problems of pre-
conception injury pose interesting and puzzling questions in tort law. The
fact that radiation is a major causative factor in genetic damage and precon-
ception injuries tends to make the problems even more complex. Cases in-
volving genetic damage from radiation have not reached the courts in the
numbers which some writers had feared and predicted. Perhaps this is not
so surprising when one considers the long-term nature of these particular in-
juries contrasted with the short time in which nuclear energy has been used
to any significant extent.' 6 '
Potentially the most disastrous peaceful use of nuclear energy is in large
scale nuclear reactors, and all indications are that this usage will in-
crease dramatically in the future.' 6 2 Potential exposure to radiation acci-
dents will thus inevitably increase. With this increased exposure, and an
increased public awareness of the hazards, 16 3 it seems particularly likely that
more suits alleging genetic damages will be brought. The recent Jorgensen
case is at least an indicator that plaintiffs and their attorneys are aware of
the possibility of this approach.
Awareness and discussion of these problems now should make it easier
for the courts -to make -the transition from prenatal to preconception con-
cepts, and at least to allow the plaintiff to get into court with a cause of
action and to have an opportunity to prove his case. The problem of prov-
ing causation will undoubtedly be the most troublesome one to be faced by
the plaintiff, once he is allowed to assert a cause of action. Technological
advances in genetics, although great, do not appear to offer the potential
to prove genetic injury under the ordinary rules of causation because of the
probabilistic or statistical nature of the injury. Even under a system of strict
liability, this remains a major stumbling block which is likely to deny re-
covery in meritorious cases. The contingent injury fund, which takes into
account the statistical nature of the injury, offers a promising legislative ap-
160. Estep & Forgotson, supra note I, at 52-53.
161. As an indication of this, the thirty-year limitation period contained in the
British statutes, discussed in text accompanying notes 82-84 supra, more than spans the
entire nuclear era, 1945 to present.
162. One writer states that the Price-Anderson Act itself "encourages and permits
industry to employ an extremely hazardous technology, fraught with the potential for
catastrophe." Green, supra note 86, at 506 (emphasis added).
163. See, e.g., Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d
1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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proach. If, however, the fate of -the Model Nuclear Facilities Liability Act
is any indication of the probability of success, then it would appear unlikely
that such legislation will be enacted in the absence of more cases and public
interest to provide an impetus.
A modest prediction of common law development would be that the
courts will eventually extend the logic of the prenatal cases to the precon-
ception cases and at least recognize a cause of action for such injuries. How
soon this occurs will also depend on the volume of cases in which the ques-
tion is raised before the courts; a large number of prenatal cases passed
before the courts before they changed the old rules arbitrarily denying re-
covery for those injuries.
In any event, discussion of the problems should continue, even for those
pragmatists who doubt the practical value of such discussion. This is a con-
temporary example in which application of Professor Keeton's "creative con-
tinuity" in tort law appears to be particularly appropriate. As stated above,
"[s]ome imaginative thinking is indicated."'16 4  The usefulness of such
imaginative thinking need not be limited to the narrow issues involved here
for "[t]he results of these studies might well have applicability . . . in other
areas where legal systems and legal rules must solve new problems created
by scientific and technical advances."' 16 5
164. ATOMS 30.
165. Estep & Forgotson, supra note 1, at 53.
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